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THE GATE IS OPEN BUT THE DOOR IS LOCKED- 
HABEAS CORPUS AND HARMLESS ERROR 
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN* 
State prisoners challenging their confinement through the writ of habeas 
corpus must first pass through the gate of the federal court system.' The 
Supreme Court's "new habeas" jurisprudence2 has imposed a variety of 
procedural obstacles to block that gate. Defaulted claims? successive claims: 
new claimsy5 and Fourth Amendment claims6 are generally barred.' Even a 
claim of actual innocence ordinarily does not gain entryy8 although it may 
serve as a precondition to consideration of otherwise barred claims.g 
* Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor, Pace University School of Law. 
1. I use the metaphors of the "gate" and the "door" to distinguish between threshold 
questions on federal habeas review and the merits of the claim. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 
2482, 2500 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Court should decide threshold questions 
in favor of petitioner before addressing merits of claim). The Court similarly has employed these 
metaphors to describe this distinction. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993) (stating 
that "claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway 
through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim 
considered on the merits"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 520 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that past decisions were "reasoned decisions that those policies were an insufficient 
justification for shutting the federal habeas door to litigants with federal constitutional claims"). 
2. Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 941 (1991). The author describes 
how the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have "developed a series of purportedly discretionary 
limits on the federal courts' exercise of their habeas jurisdiction which have de facto altered that 
jurisdiction beyond recognition." Id. at 1062. Professor Patchel concludes that "by altering the 
process by which constitutional adjudication takes place-by moving from a system of dialectical 
federalism to one of deference to state court constitutional determinations-those Courts neces- 
sarily have altered the future shape of the substantive content of constitutional doctrine as well." 
Id. at 106243. . 
3. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
4. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) 
(plurality opinion). 
5. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
6. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
7. The bar may be lifted when the petitioner can demonstrate "cause" and "prejudice" 
for the procedural default. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992); Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). 
8. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). The Court left the door slightly ajar for 
such a claim: 
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case 
a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render 
the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if 
there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. 
Id. at 869. 
9. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19 (1992) (petitioner othenvise subject to 
defenses of abusive or  successive use of writ and who cannot meet cause and prejudice standard 
nevertheless may have his federal constitutional claim considered on merits if he makes proper 
showing of "actual innocence," so that failure to hear his claims would constitute "miscarriage 
of justice"). 
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When an unbarred claim is brought, a petitioner may enter the gate 
unimpeded, at least to allow a court to consider his constitutional claim on 
the merits. And if the claim has merit, a court has discretion to grant the 
writ.1° However, even with unbarred claims a petitioner ordinarily confronts 
another obstacle to prevailing on the merits. Just as reviewing courts may 
overlook constitutional errors that are harmle~s,~' the federal courts on 
collateral review traditionally have applied harmless error principles to preserve 
state convictions despite constitutional error.12 Prior to Brecht v. Abraham- 
son,13 the federal courts typically applied the same harmless error standard 
for collateral review of constitutional errors as they applied on direct appeal, 
namely, whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.14 The issue in Brecht was whether courts should apply the constitutional 
harmless error standard for direct appeal on collateral review, or whether 
courts should apply a more rigorous standard. A majority of the Court, in 
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that courts should use a more 
onerous test, one that requires the petitioner to show not that the error 
resulted in the possibility of harm but, rather, that the error caused actual 
and substantial harm. Under Brecht, the habeas petitioner could enter the 
gate, but he might find the courtroom doors locked and his otherwise 
meritorious petition denied. 
Brecht is a paradigm of the Rehnquist Court's result-oriented approach 
to habeas corpus and harmless error. The decision purports to be a principled 
application of the policies of finality, federalism, and judicial economy that 
underlay the Court's new habeas and harmless error jurisprudence. It is, in 
fact, an unwarranted and unprincipled extension of those policies. Depending 
on how the lower federal courts interpret and implement the decision, Brecht 
could have a devastating impact on the way state prosecutors and judges 
administer criminal justice, as well as the ability of state prisoners to redress 
constitutional violations. 
A. Facts and Lower Court Findings 
Todd Brecht, an ex-convict, resided with his sister and her husband, 
Roger Hartman, in their Wisconsin home.15 There was some tension in the 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988) (judge required to "dispose of the matter as law and justice 
require"); Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n.11 (reaffirming equitable nature of writ and emphasizing 
that "discretion is implicit in the statutory command"); Patchel, supra note 2, at 964 ("This 
focus on discretionary limits on habeas jurisdiction subsequently became a hallmark of the 
Court's decisions limiting the scope of habeas review."). 
11. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
12. See infra note 14 (discussing Chapman standard). 
13. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
14. Chapman, 386 U.S. at  24 ("beneficiary of a constitutional error [required] to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained"). 
15. State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Wis. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Brecht v. Abra- 
hamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
Heinonline - -  51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 116 1994 
19941 HABEAS CORPUS 117 
household because Hartman, a local district attorney, did not approve of 
Brecht's drinking habits and homosexual orientation. When the Hartmans 
were away, Brecht broke into a liquor cabinet and began drinking. He found 
a rifle and began shooting cans in the backyard. When Hartman returned 
home from work, Brecht shot him in the back and sped off in Mrs. Hartman's 
car. Brecht drove the car into a ditch, and when a police officer stopped to 
offer help, Brecht told him that his sister knew about the mishap and had 
summoned a tow-truck. Brecht then hitched a ride to Winona, Minnesota, 
where he was stopped by police, identified, and arrested for the shooting. 
He told the police that it was a "big mistake." He wqs returned to Wisconsin, 
arraigned, and given his Miranda rights. Roger Hartman died, and Brecht 
was charged with first-degree murder. 
At his trial, Brecht admitted shooting Hartman but claimed it was an 
accident. He testified that when he saw Hartman pulling into the driveway, 
he ran to replace the gun but tripped on the stairs, causing the gun to fire 
the fatal shot. Seeing what he had done, Brecht panicked and drove away. 
The prosecution offered circumstantial evidence to prove that the shooting 
was intentional: forensic proof of the bullet's somewhat horizontal trajectory, 
the location outside the house where the rifle was found, and proof of 
Hartman's hostility toward Brecht as the motive for the shooting. In addition, 
the prosecutor pointed out that Brecht had failed to tell anyone that the 
shooting was an accident-the officer who first encountered him beside the 
ditch, or the Winona police who arrested him.'6 During his cross examination 
of Brecht, and over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor asked Brecht 
whether he had ever told anyone prior to trial that the shooting was an 
accident, to which Brecht replied "No."" During his closing argument, the 
prosecutor also made several references about Brecht's pretrial silence to the 
16. The prosecutor made extensive use of Brecht's silence both before and after he was 
given Miranda warnings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's references 
to Brecht's pre-Miranda silence were permissible and did not violate Brecht's constitutional rights. 
Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at  103; see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1980) (holding Fifth 
Amendment not violated when testifying defendant impeached with hi pre-arrest silence). The 
federal district court on habeas review agreed with this conclusion. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 
F. Supp. 500, 507 0V.D. Wis. 1991), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S. 
Ct. 1710 (1993). 
17. The prosecutor's cross-examination of Brecht included the following: 
Q. In fact the first time you have ever told this story is when you testified here today 
was it not? 
. . . . 
A. You mean the story of actually what happened? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I knew what happened, I'm just telling it the way it happened, yes, I didn't have 
a chance to talk to anyone, I didn't want to call somebody from a phone and give 
up my rights, so I didn't want to talk about it, no sir. 
The prosecutor on re-cross examination inquired: 
Q. Did you tell anyone about what had happened in Alma? 
A. No I did not. 
Brechf, 421 N.W.2d at  103. 
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jury, insinuating that Brecht tailored his newly-fabricated claim to mesh with 
the state's proof.18 The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Brecht was sentenced 
to life imprisonment. 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the convi~tion.'~ The court 
found that the prosecutor's references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence vio- 
lated due process under Doyle v. Ohio,zo and that the error was sufficiently 
prejudicial to require re~ersal.~' The court emphasized the "frequency" and 
"vigorous nature" with which the prosecutor assailed Brecht's silence, the 
closeness of the proof on the issue of intent, and the "critical" role of 
Brecht's credibility in the o u t c ~ m e . ~  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the con~ict ion.~ The court 
agreed that the prosecutor had committed constitutional error but concluded 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that 
the improper references were relatively brief, comprising less than two pages 
of a nine hundred page transcript, and that the evidence of guilt was 
Brecht petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, 
reasserting the Doyle violation. The district court set aside the convict i~n.~~ 
The court concluded that the error violated due process, and that under the 
standard for constitutional error formulated in Chapman v. Cal i f~rnia ,~~ the 
18. During closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to "remember that Mr. Brecht ' 
never volunteered until in this courtroom what happened in the Hartman residence. . .;" "He 
sits back here and sees all of our evidence go in and then comes out with this crazy story . . .;" 
"I know what I'd say [had I been in the defendant's shoes], I'd say 'hold on, this was a mistake, 
this was an accident, let me tell you what happened,' but he didn't say that did he. No, he 
waited until he hears our story." Id. 
19. State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 421 N.W.2d 96 (Wis. 
1988) and rev'd sub nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991). and aff'd. 113 
S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
20. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle recognized that a suspect's silence after being given Miranda 
warnings may be nothing more than an  exercise of rights guaranteed by those warnings and 
therefore "insolubly ambiguous." Id. at  617. The Court found it fundamentally unfair for the 
state to implicitly assure a suspect that prosecutors would not use his silence against him, and 
then turn around and use that silence for impeachment. Id. at 618. "[Tlhe use for impeachment 
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619. 
21. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d at 723. "In a first-degree murder prosecution in which intent is 
established solely by circumstantial evidence and the defendant's credibility is a critical issue, 
impermissible comments that attack credibility heighten the danger of prejudice. . . . Because the 
defense relied heavily upon Brecht's credibility and because the prosecutor's comments were 
clearly improper, we conclude that the comments on Brecht's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence 
were prejudicial. 
22. Id. at  722-23. 
23. State v. Brecht. 421 N.W.2d 96, 106 (Wis. 1988) rev'dsub nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
24. Id. at 104. 
25. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500, 510 (W.D. Wis. 1991). rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363 
(7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S .  Ct. 1710 (1993). 
26. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
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state failed to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Reviewing de novo the state court's determination that the error was 
harmless,27 the district court found that the evidence of guilt was not "over- 
whelming," and that the prosecutor's references were "crucial" because 
Brecht's defense turned on his ~redibility.~~ According to the district court, 
"the state's remarks that [Brecht] simply concocted a 'crazy story' at the 
time of trial may have been determinati~e."~~ 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.30 The Seventh 
Circuit agreed that the prosecutor violated Doyle,3I but differed with the 
district court on the nature of the violation and on the applicable harmless 
error ~tandard.'~ The circuit court construed Doyle not as a constitutional 
right, but as a "prophylactic rule . . . to protect another prophylactic rule 
[Miranda] from erosion or misuse."33 Having determined that a Doyle vio- 
lation is not a constitutional error, the circuit court applied the harmless 
error standard for nonconstitutional errors found in Kotteakos v. United 
States34-whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence 
in determining the jury's verdict."35 Applying this standard, the circuit court 
concluded that given the otherwise proper references to Brecht's pretrial 
silence, the petitioner could not contend with a "straight face" that the 
prosecutor's references had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's 
verdi~t.'~ 
B. Brecht v. Abrahamson and the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question which the 
Court failed to reach five years earlier in Greer v. Miller37-whether the 
traditional standard for constitutional harmless error applies on collateral 
review of Doyle  violation^.^^ The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, initially disagreed 
with the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the Doyle rule as a non- 
constitutional rule."g Doyle, the majority explained, "was not simply a further 
extension of the Miranda prophylactic rule. Rather, as we have discussed, it 
27. United States v. Flannigan, 884 F.2d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 1989) (federal court not 
bound by state court's ruling that constitutional error is harmless), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1027 
(1990). 
28. Brecht, 759 F. Supp. at 508. 
29. Id. 
30. Brecht v. Abraharnson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1376 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 
2931 (1992). and aff'd by 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
31. Id. at 1368. 
32. Id. at 1375. 
33. Id. at 1370. 
34. 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
35. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 
36. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1376. 
37. 483 U.S. 756 (1987). 
38. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 761 n.3, 765 (1987). 
39. Brecht v. Abraharnson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993). 
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is rooted in fundamental fairness and due process concerns."40 Having 
determined that a Doyle violation is a constitutional error, the Court further 
decided that a Doyle violation "fits squarely into the category of constitutional 
violations which we have characterized as 'trial error,"' and is therefore 
"amenable to harmless error analysis" under the standard formulated in 
Chapman v. Cal if~rnia.~~ The Court observed, however, that the Chapman 
standard applies to direct review, and "we have yet squarely to address its 
applicability on collateral review."" The habeas corpus statute, the Court 
noted, is silent on the standard of review of constitutional error.43 The Court 
proceeded to "fill the gapu" by examining "the considerations underlying 
our habeas jurisprudence," and "whether the proposed rule would advance 
or inhibit these considerations by weighing the marginal costs and benefits 
of its application on collateral review."44 
The Court commenced this portion of its discussion by reiterating that 
"collateral review is different from direct re vie^."^' Because of this difference, 
the Court observed, different rules have been prescribed for habeas than have 
been applied on direct review.46 These standards are considerably more 
restrictive than similar standards pertaining to direct review, the Court noted, 
and they serve to confine habeas corpus to a "secondary and limited" role 
that is reserved only to those "'persons whom society has grievously 
~ronged."'~' The Court explained that considerations of finality, federalism, 
and comity have traditionally supported such disparate treatment.48 "State 
courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and evaluate its 
prejudicial effect," and often are in a superior position to make such 
 determination^.^^ Thus, "it scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas 
courts to engage in the identical approach to harmless error review that 
Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct review."50 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1718. The Court cited the following several cases in which .it had applied the 
Chapman standard on habeas review: Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 
U.S. 570 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 
(1968) (per curiam). 
43. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718. The federal habeas corpus statute directs the court to 
"dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. 8 2243 (1988). The proposed 
Habeas Corpus Reform Act does not specify any particular standard of review, but does state: 
"[Tlhe Federal courts, in reviewing an application under this section, shall review de novo the 
rulings of a State court on matters of federal law, including the application of federal law to 
facts." S. 1441. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 2257(b) (1993). 
44. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1720. Examples of such disparate treatment, the Court noted, include rules 
governing retroactivity, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the right to counsel, Pennsylvania 
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the "plain error" rule, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 
(1982), and Fourth Amendment claims, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
47. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440-441 (1963)). 
48. Id. at 1720. 
49. Id. at 1721. 
50. Id. 
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The Court discounted the suggestion that easing the Chapman standard 
on collateral review would undermine the interest of deterring states from 
relaxing their enforcement of constitutional rights?' In any event, the Court 
stated, "the costs of applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas 
outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any, which would be derived from 
its application on collateral review."S2 Moreover, retrying defendants whose 
convictions are set aside imposes significant "social costs," which militate in 
favor of applying a more rigorous standard on habeas 
Thus, although disagreeing with the theoretical basis upon which the 
Seventh Circuit's decision rested, the Court nevertheless agreed with, and 
substantially broadened, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the Chapman 
standard should not be applied on collateral review of Doyle violations. The 
Court agreed that the Kotteakos standard for nonconstitutional error is "better 
tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review, and more likely to 
promote the considerations underlying our recent habeas cases."54 Under this 
test, habeas petitioners can obtain relief for any constitutional trial error if 
"they can establish" that the error "had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict."55 Petitioners have the burden of 
establishing, in other words, "that [the constitutional trial error] resulted in 
'actual prejudi~e."'~~ The Court, in a footnote, left the door slightly ajar for 
"an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, 
or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct," even 
though the misconduct did not substantially influence the jury's verdict." 
Justice Stevens provided the crucial fifth vote for the Court's decision.58 
He wrote a concurring opinion cautioning lower federal courts against an 
unduly broad interpretation, and emphasizing that the Court's new standard 
"is appropriately demanding."59 Disagreeing with the assertion in the majority 
opinion that the burden of proof rests on the petitioner, Justice Stevens 
51. Id. at 1721. "Absent affirmative evidence that statecourt judges are ignoring their 
oath, we discount petitioner's argument that courts will respond to our ruling by violating their 
Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution." Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. Such costs include "expenditure of additional time and resources," "'erosion of 
memory' and 'dispersion of witnesses,"' and "the frustration of society's interest in the prompt 
administration of justice." Id, 
54. Id. at 1722. 
55. Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986), 
as authority for this holding. Lane did apply the "actual prejudice" standard to a non- 
constitutional error. Lane, however, did not place the burden of proving harm upon the defendant, 
and the Court's citation for that novel rule is misplaced. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act would 
place the burden of proving harmlessness upon the State. See supra note 43 (discussing Habeas 
Corpus Reform Act); infra note 83 (same). 
56. Brecht v. Abraharnson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993). 
57. Id. at 1722 n.9. 
58. Justice Stevens had concurred in Greer v. Miller. 483 U.S. 756 (1987), but would have 
reached the question left open by the Court, and held that a federal court on habeas review 
should apply a more relaxed harmless error standard in reviewing Doyle violations. Id. at 768. 
59. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723. 
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explicitly stated that the burden of showing the error's harmlessness rests on 
the g~vernment .~~ Moreover, the reviewing court must evaluate the error 
under the Court's "longstanding commitment to the de novo standard of 
review of mixed questions of law and fact in habeas corpus  proceeding^."^' 
Justice Stevens also emphasized the portion of Justice Rutledge's opinion in 
Kotteakos concerning the methodology for judicial review of harmless error. 
He admonished federal judges not to speculate upon probable reconviction, 
or upon whether the reviewing court believed the defendant to be 
Quoting a familiar passage in Kotteakos, Justice Stevens emphasized 
that the question is not were they [the jurors] right in their judgment, 
regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what 
effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon 
the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done 
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total 
setting. 
60. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority opinion "is correct" because that opinion, 
among other things, "places the burden on prosecutors to explain why those errors were 
harmless." Id. One wonders, therefore, why Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion when 
there existed such a substantial difference concerning the party bearing the burden of proof on 
the issue of harm, as  well as the rigorousness with which lower courts should evaluate the impact 
of the error. Given Justice Stevens' concurring opinion explicitly dissociating himself from the 
majority's placement of the burden on the defendant, it would appear that a majority of the 
Court (Justice Stevens and the four dissenters) endorses the traditional rule imposing the burden 
on the prosecutor to prove harmlessness, as well as an approach to harmless error analysis 
considerably more demanding than the approach taken by the plurality. Several circuit courts 
that have employed the new Brecht standard have placed the burden on the petitioner to prove 
substantial harm. See Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating petitioner 
must show that alleged error had substantial and injurious effect on jury's verdict), cert. denied 
62 U.S.L.W. 3615, 62 U.S.L.W. 3623 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1994) (No. 93-971); Tague v. Richards, 3 
F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that petitioner not entitled to habeas relief unless 
petitioner can establish that error resulted in actual prejudice); Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 
1427 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating burden is on petitioner to show error had significant inculpatory 
impact); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 724 (11th Cir.) (stating that relevant habeas corpus 
inquiry was whether petitioner could prove actual prejudice), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). 
By contrast, some circuit courts have placed the burden on the government to prove lack of 
substantial harm. See Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209,213 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that prosecutor 
bears burden of proof to demonstrate that error did not have substantial and injurious effect on 
jury's verdict); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that burden of 
sustaining verdict rested on prosecutor to demonstrate error was harmless). Some circuit courts 
that have applied the standard have not indicated which party bears the burden of proof. See 
Shaw v. Collins. 5 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Lowery in applying Brecht standard to 
videotaped testimony of victim); Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Cumbie in applying Brecht standard), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994); McKinney v. Rees, 
993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.) (applying Brecht standard), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993); 
Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d 1218, 1226 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993). 
61. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (1993). The standard "requires a habeas 
court to review the entire record de novo in determining whether the error influenced the jury's 
deliberations." Id. at 1723. 
62. Id. at  1724. The standard requires courts to engage in the "discrimination . . . of 
judgment transcending confinement by formula or  precise rule." Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946)). 
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This must take account of what the error meant to them, not 
singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that 
happened. And one must judge others' reactions not by his own, but 
with allowance for how others might react and not be regarded 
generally as acting without reason. This is the important difference, 
but one easy to ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from 
the record.'j3 
"In the end," Justice Stevens wrote, "the way we phrase the governing 
standard is far less important than the quality of the judgment with which 
it is applied. "6.1 
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and 
Souter joined. Justice White found it "inexplicable" that to obtain relief 
based upon a constitutional error that is harmful under the Chapman stan- 
dard, a petitioner must bear the burden of proving actual p re jud i~e .~~  More- 
over, because Arizona v. Fulminante66 subjects virtually all constitutional trial 
errors to harmless error analysis, "a state court determination that a consti- 
tutional error . . . is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has in effect become 
unreviewable by lower federal courts by way of habeas corpus."67 Further, 
to the extent that the availability of habeas relief deters prosecutors and 
judges from violating their constitutional responsibilities, the Court's decision 
undermines this Justice White summarized the issue in this way: 
Ultimately, the central question is whether States may detain some- 
one whose conviction was tarnished by a constitutional violation that 
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman dictates that 
they may not; the majority suggests that, so long as direct review 
has not corrected this error in time, they may.69 
Justice OYConnor filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice O'ConnorYs 
dissent assailed the majority for ignoring what she contended was the central 
goal of the criminal justice system-to provide accurate determinations of 
guilt and inn0cence.7~ Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, Justice OYConnor 
wrote, and the ultimate equity on the habeas petitioner's side is the "possibility 
that an error may have caused the conviction of an actually innocent 
per~on."~' The Chapman harmless error standard is "inextricably intertwined" 
with the goal of reliable determinations of g~ i l t . 7~  A verdict that is found to 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "sufficiently restores confidence in 
63. Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)) (emphasis in original). 
64. Id. at 1725. 
65. Id. at 1727. 
66. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
67. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1727 (1993). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1728. 
70. Id. at 1729. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1730. 
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the verdict's reliability that the conviction may stand despite the potentially 
accuracy impairing error."73 By contrast, Justice 07Connor argued, the Kot- 
teakos standard does not offer an adequate assurance of the verdict's relia- 
bili t~. '~ "By tolerating a greater probability that an error with the potential 
to undermine verdict accuracy was harmful, the Court increases the likelihood 
that a conviction will be preserved despite an error that actually affected the 
reliability of the trial."75 Justice O'Connor offered the cynical observation 
that the only explanation for the Court's adoption of a more onerous harmless 
error standard for collateral review is "that denying [habeas] relief whenever 
possible is an unalloyed good."76 
Brecht v. Abrahamson fuses two major goals of the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts: restricting habeas corpus and expanding harmless error. Although 
the Courts substantially achieved both goals prior to Brecht, that case merged 
these objectives under the rhetoric of finality, federalism, and judicial econ- 
omy. This familiar rhetoric has been the hallmark of the new habeas juris- 
prudence, in much the same way that it has formed the linchpin for the 
Court's broadened application of harmless error. The Court's aggressive 
result-oriented approach to both habeas corpus and harmless error has 
countered and displaced much of the Warren Court's expansive constitution- 
alization of criminal procedure. 
One cannot neatly summarize the "new habeas." Each Term seems to 
bring several new decisions that further restrict the availability of the writ. 
Clearly, the habeas of Brown v. Allenn and Fay v. N ~ i a ~ ~  is a far cry from 
the habeas of Teague v. Lane,79 McClakey v. ZantYs0 Coleman v. Thomp~on,~' 
and Brecht v. Abraham~on .~  In the absence of legislation amending the 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1732. 
77. 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) ("The State court cannot have the last say when it, though 
on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a 
federal constitutional right."). 
78. 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963) (finding that federal habeas corpus statute manifests "clear 
congressional policy of affording a federal forum for the determination of the federal claims of 
state criminal defendants"), overruled by Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992). 
79. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation "new rule" an- 
nounced subsequent to petitioner's conviction). 
80. 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation not raised in previous 
habeas petition). 
81. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation not preserved in 
state appellate proceedings). 
82. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation did not actually 
prejudice petitioner's rights). 
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federal habeas corpus the Court has shown an extraordinarily activist 
bent to federal criminal procedure by recasting the habeas statute in a manner 
markedly different from the interpretation of the Court a generation ago. 
Virtually all of the Court's recent decisions have imposed procedural 
barriers to invoking the writ. These restrictions are grounded on principles 
of federal abstention to the exercise of state power. In one instance, however, 
the Court has actually imposed a substantive limitation by removing from 
habeas coverage a specific constitutional claim. In Stone v. Powell,s4 the 
Court held that when the state provides a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that the 
prisoner be granted habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional search and seizure was used at his trial. Although Stone 
represents a significant reduction in constitutional protection, the Court has 
resisted further opportunities to remove other substantive constitutional claims 
from habeas review.85 However, in no case prior to Brecht has the Court 
imposed a different substantive standard for reviewing the same constitutional 
violation, depending on whether the claim was reviewed on direct appeal or 
collateral review.86 By formulating a more rigorous harmless error standard 
for habeas review, and inexplicably shifting the burden of proof from the 
government to the petitioner, the Brecht Court has imposed as formidable a 
substantive barrier to prevailing on meritorious constitutional claims as any 
that the Court has ever erected. 
Prior to Brecht, a federal court was precluded from granting habeas relief 
with respect to constitutional trial errors unless three conditions were met: 
first, that a non-Fourth Amendment constitutional violation was committed; 
second, that the petitioner was not procedurally barred from having his claim 
heard on the merits; and third, that the state reviewing court concluded, 
83. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act (known as the "Biden Bill") presently being considered 
by Congress would amend the habeas corpus act in some respects, although largely incorporating 
several of the Supreme Court's most restrictive rulings. With regard to Brecht, the bill requires 
the state to bear the burden of proving harmlessness, and also requires de novo review by federal 
courts of state court rulings on matters of federal law. See S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
5 2257(b) (1993); see also Daniel Wise, House, Senate Diverge On Altering Habeas Law, N.Y.L.J., 
Nov. 9. 1993, at 1. 
84. 428 U.S. 465, 489-496 (1976). 
85. See Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (Miranda claims); Kimmelman v. 
hlorrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); 
Rose v. hlitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (equal protection claims involving grand jury discrimination); 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (due process claims of insufficient evidence). 
86. Harmless error is more appropriately classified as a substantive rule than a procedural 
rule. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 39-40 (1970) ("[A] harmless- 
error rule could hardly be deemed procedural. It has nothing to d o  with regulating the methods 
by which the facts are made known to the court. It does not come into play until aU the facts 
are known, the area of dispute is defined, and the materials have been presented for the 
determination of rights and duties. Far from being procedural, a harmless-error rule is of a piece 
with substantive rules, for it too is a mandate to the judge, at  this stage the appellate judge, 
calling for the last word on the legal effect of the findings."); see also Edmund M .  Morgan, 
Rules of Evidence: Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 468 (1957). 
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erroneously, either that no constitutional violation occurred, or notwithstand- 
ing the violation, that no reasonable possibility existed that the violation 
contributed to the result.87 Only if. all three of these conditions were met 
would a federal court have the discretionary authority to vacate the convic- 
t i ~ n . ~ *  Moreover, when these conditions are met, as in Brecht-when the state 
has committed a constitutional violation and then arguably failed to correct 
it-then a federal judicial policy of nonintervention, or diminished opportunity 
for intervention, requires "some reasoned institutional justification" for re- 
stricting redetermination on the merits.89 By limiting federal redetermination 
in instances of acknowledged constitutional violations, and under circum- 
stances in which review is not procedurally barred, the majority in Brecht 
authorized a radical departure from settled practice without any principled 
justification for such a result. 
The Court's failure to provide a reasoned analysis is graphically illustrated 
by its cursory reference to the policy of finality as one of the principal 
grounds for its decision. To be sure, the rhetoric of finality has been the 
driving force behind the Court's restriction of habeas review.g0 The rationale 
usually attributed to finality in habeas litigation is to accord conclusiveness 
to a presumptively correct state judgment that has survived direct review 
within the state court system. The Court in Brecht simply asserted, without 
any further elaboration, that a state court should be permitted to rely on the 
policy of finality to protect its judgment from collateral attack. The Court 
cited three habeas decisions for that as~ert ion.~~ Unlike Brecht, none of those 
cases involved a petition for collateral review to remedy a conceded consti- 
tutional violation that the state review process arguably failed to correct 
under the federal harmless error standard. There is no presumption of 
correctness to such a judgment, nor any institutional justification for according 
conclusiveness to that judgment. To be sure, the interest in finality is 
implicated whenever a judgment is challenged collaterally. However, if finality 
87. Brecht does not address whether its new standard applies if the state court never 
considered the harmless error issue because it found no constitutional error. The Court's emphasis 
in Brecht on the illogic of requiring a federal court to engage in the identical harmless error 
analysis review that Chapman requires state courts to engage suggests that the new approach to 
harmless error review under Brecht would not be applicable when the state court did not review 
the constitutional error under the Chapman standard. For a recent circuit court decision adopting 
this approach, see Omdorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1993). 
88. The Court has consistently asserted that habeas is an equitable remedy and that a court 
always has the discretion to grant or deny the writ. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) 
(describing discretionary nature of granting habeas corpus writ). 
89. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for Slate Prisoners, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963). 
90. Patchel, supra note 2, a t  943. Professor Bator's functional analysis of habeas review 
has been one of the most influential philosophical justifications for the Court's new restrictive 
approach to habeas review. See general& Bator, supra note 89 (discussing and analyzing Court's 
functional analysis). 
91. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993) (citing Wright v. West, 112 S. 
Ct. 2482 (1992)); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 ' 
U.S. 72, 90 (1977). 
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could be invoked to justify restricting the availability of habeas relief when 
a state judgment concededly is marred by constitutional error, as in Brecht, 
then federal courts could use finality to justify restricting habeas conceivably 
in every context. Congress could hardly have intended such a construction. 
when it enacted the Habeas Corpus Act. 
The Court's reliance on the policies of federalism and comity suffers 
from the same instrumentalism. The Court merely reiterated the familiar 
rhetoric of federalism and comity: "States possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law";92 states "hold the initial responsi- 
bility for vindicating constitutional rights";93 and federal interference with 
such state duties "frustrate[s] both the States' sovereign power to punish 
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."* 
However, invoking the rhetoric of judicial deference in the context of a 
conceded deprivation of a fair trial is patently disingenuous. Indeed, one 
might reasonably view such a context as the paradigmatic occasion for 
collateral review under habeas corpus, rather than a cause for indiscriminate 
deference to state constitutional derelictions. 
Moreover, the Court argues that federal review of constitutional errors 
under Chapman is unnecessary because no evidence shows that states are 
failing to protect federal constitutional rights. This argument goes too far. 
In essence, taken to its logical conclusion, the Court seems to suggest that 
habeas review is unnecessary because states are satisfactorily protecting con- 
stitutional rights. In addition, this argument also misconceives the role of 
habeas as a deterrent to unconstitutional state action. The writ, although 
substantially weakened, is nonetheless the only recourse, save for certiorari 
to the Supreme Court, for federal redress of state constitutional violations 
that have gone uncorrected in state proceedings. Brecht ignores this point: 
the prosecutor in Brecht engaged in deliberate and fundamentally unfair 
conduct that violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Every 
reviewing court agreed on this point; their disagreement was over the extent 
of the prejudice. One can hardly doubt that foreclosing a federal court from 
applying longstanding federal harmless error doctrine to measure the extent 
of that prejudice and substituting instead a virtually unreachable standard 
would serve the interests of federalism and comity. However, such action 
would also fail to  protect federal constitutional rights from encroachments 
by state prosecutors and judges. 
Indeed, Brecht's impact will not likely be lost on state officials. Prose- 
cutors now know that a conviction marred by constitutional trial error that 
survives state review will be further insulated from collateral attack. State 
appellate courts now know that an affirmance of a conviction despite con- 
stitutional error is more secure under Brecht than ever before. 
92. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 
(1982)). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
Heinonline - -  51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 127 1994 
128 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 5 1 : 1 15 
The Court's reliance on federalism and comity arguably is relevant in 
other contexts. For example, when state prisoners have defaulted on state 
claims, have otherwise abused process, or have invoked new constitutional 
principles that were not apparent when their conviction was obtained, state 
courts may be acting reasonably and in good faith in reviewing, or declining 
to review, constitutional claims. Indeed, unless a petitioner can advance a 
sufficient claim of actual innocence, a petitioner would be hard put to 
demonstrate that the equities favor federal intervention. However, one cannot 
make a similar argument for federal restraint when: (1) the state itself has 
defaulted in upholding constitutional rights; (2) the petitioner has made a 
good-faith attempt to litigate her constitutional claims in the state courts; 
and (3) the state's judgment is being assailed for failing to vindicate the 
violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights. The equities in such circum- 
stances plainly favor the petitioner, not the state, and federal abstention, or 
diminished opportunity for correction, in Justice White's view, is "inexpli- 
cable. "95 
Thus, the majority has no support when it asserts that "it scarcely seems 
logical to require federal courts to engage in the identical approach to 
harmless-error review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on 
direct review."% It is no more illogical to require de novo review of the 
state's harmless error determination than to require de novo review by federal 
courts as to whether a state constitutional error was committed at 
Indeed, it is both illogical and unfair to deny de novo federal review of 
constitutional errors under the federal standard when the state court arguably 
has not accorded a petitioner a full' and fair review. To be sure, federal 
courts accord state courts considerable deference, particularly with respect to 
state fact-finding determinations?* However, federal courts never accord 
deference for erroneous applications of federal law. An erroneous application 
of Chapman's federal standard has never been entitled to a deferential 
standard of review. 
Moreover, it is beside the point for the Court to assefi that state courts 
"occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate the effect of trial 
error" and "are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and evaluate 
its prejudicial effect on the trial process."99 The undeniable fact is that the 
prosecutor in Brecht committed a constitutional transgression, and the state 
appellate court arguably failed in its constitutional obligation to evaluate that 
violation correctly. When the state defaultsin protecting constitutional rights, 
either in committing the violation or failing to correct it, it is neither principled 
nor logical to suggest that federalism and comity prevent a federal court from 
95. Id. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 1721. 
97. Id. at 17 10 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
98. See 28 U.S.C. 8 2254(d) (1988) (stating that state court findings of fact are entitled to 
presumption of correctness and are reversible only when found to be clearly erroneous); Sumner 
v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-547 (1981) (discussing 8 2254(d)). 
99. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993). 
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redressing that violation under the self-same federal standard that the state 
court misapplied initially. 
For similar reasons, the majority's reliance on "social costsy7 for replacing 
the Chapman standard on habeas review is illogical and perverse. To the 
Court, these costs outweigh the benefits of correcting constitutional errors, 
including the benefits of deterring state prosecutors and judges from violating 
constitutional rights and of providing judicial relief to a person whom society 
has wronged. Once again, if carried further, this justification would abolish 
collateral review. Every form of collateral review necessitates expenditure of 
time and resources, frequently involves erosion of memory and dispersion of 
witnesses, and may frustrate society's interest in the prompt administration 
of justice. The Court has consistently invoked these "costs" as one of the 
principal justifications to restrict habeas review in other contexts, notably 
defaulted claims,100 Fourth Amendment claims,101 and abuses of the writ.lo2 
However, as Justice O'Connor observed, "such costs are inevitable 
whenever relief is awarded."lo3 Moreover, there is a significant difference 
between computing social costs when the equities favor the state and when 
the equities favor the petitioner. Plainly, if the prosecutor in Brecht had been 
sensitive to the accused's rights and behaved ethically and professionally, the 
prosecutor would not have violated a well-established constitutional rule. 
Clearly, the prosecutor in Brecht knew exactly what he was doing. The 
prosecutor measured his conduct not against a legal or ethical norm, but 
against a prediction that the appellate court would view the extra mileage 
gained from violating the defendant's due process rights as harmless. Of 
course, if the prosecutor had not engaged in such calculated misconduct, no 
court, federal or state, would have had occasion to invoke the rhetoric of 
social costs. The state appellate court would have affirmed the conviction, 
and federal review would have been unavailable and unnecessary. 
By the same token, if the state appellate court had correctly evaluated 
the prosecutor's constitutional violation in the first place and found under 
the Chapman standard that the defendant deserved a new trial, the party 
responsible for that burden properly would have borne the costs of litigation. 
Indeed, these costs would have been viewed as the price the Constitution 
imposes on the state for violating a defendant's constitutional rights. By 
contrast, costs that the state originally avoided by defaulting in its duty to 
provide prompt and effective relief should not later provide the so-called 
"prudential" basisIM for imposing on the other party whose rights were 
violated a new and more stringent burden when that party seeks collaterally 
to vindicate his constitutional rights. 
Moreover, Brecht does not reduce the number of federal petitions or 
relieve the federal courts of the burden of habeas litigation. Petitioners will 
100. Coleman v. Thompson, 1 1 1  S. Ct. 2546, 2558-59 (1991). 
101. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n.11 (1976). 
102. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991). 
103. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
104. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1758 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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raise the same constitutional challenges as before or seek to wedge their 
arguments into the narrow exception for "deliberate and egregious" miscon- 
The federal court must still review the entire record de novo, although 
it now must evaluate the constitutional error under a more exacting standard. 
Justice 09Comor noted that Kotteakos is a much more lenient, if not more 
precise, standard than Chapman: "[Ilt will permit more errors to pass 
uncorrected . . . . It does not decrease the burden of identifying those cases 
that warrant relief."lM 
A hypothetical closely resembling one that Justice White offered in Stone 
v. Powell illustrates the illogic of the Court's double standard.Io7 Suppose 
that two defendants, A and B, are jointly indicted for murder, are tried 
separately, and are convicted on the same evidence. Each brings a state 
appeal, arguing that the prosecutor made a constitutionally impermissible 
reference to their failure to testify. The state appellate court agrees that 
constitutional error was committed, but that under Chapman the error was 
harmless. A seeks certiorari to the Supreme Court; B does not. The Supreme 
Court grants A's petition and reverses A's conviction, concluding that the 
error was not harmless under the Chapman standard. B then brings a habeas 
petition in federal court. The court, consistent with the Supreme Court's 
determination, concludes that constitutional error was committed and that 
the error was not harmless under Chapman. However, the writ is denied 
because under the new Brecht standard, the error is found harmless because 
B did not prove that the error caused actual and substantial prejudice. 
Although A and B were convicted on the same evidence and assert the same 
constitutional error, A obtains relief because the error was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, while B does not because B could not demonstrate 
that the self-same error caused actual prejudice. As Justice White observed: 
"I cannot believe that Congress intended this result."108 
The scope and the standards governing appellate review of trial errors 
have undergone a revolution under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The 
harmless error rule authorizes appellate courts to sustain convictions when 
the defendant's guilt is sufficiently clear, even though errors may have 
produced an unfair trial.Io9 The rule originally developed as an appellate 
105. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1731 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. 
107. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-37 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). I thank my 
colleague, Don Doernberg, for suggesting this variation. 
108. Id. at 537. 
109. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588-89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("An automatic 
application of harmlesserror review in case after w e ,  and for error after error, can only 
encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the ever-present 
and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular we."). 
Essentially, three different standards exist for appellate review of trial errors: the standard 
for constitutional error formulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the standard 
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mechanism to prevent "the mere etiquette of trials" or the "minutiae of 
procedure" from upsetting a verdict.l1° The rule has evolved into the most 
powerful judicial weapon to preserve convictions whenever an appellate 
tribunal, sitting as a "super-jury," concludes that the defendant is clearly 
guilty or that the error has not resulted in substantial prejudice. The most 
perverse byproduct of the new harmless error jurisprudence is its corrosive 
impact on the administration of criminal justice. The awareness that sufficient 
proof of guilt will insulate a conviction from appellate reversal encourages 
prosecutors and trial judges to overlook or deliberately violate constitutional 
rights or engage in other evidentiary and procedural violations because 
reviewing courts will find such errors to be harmless.l1I As Judge Jerome 
Frank observed, to the extent that appellate courts routinely affirm convictions 
despite serious violations, they can be viewed as condoning lawlessness, and 
themselves promoting disrespect for the law.Il2 By further insulating state 
convictions from habeas review through the creation of a more relaxed 
harmless error test, Brecht encourages state officials-prosecutors, trial judges, 
and appellate judges-to overlook constitutional norms, or take them less 
seriously. 
Viewed historically, harmless error review was never intended to override 
unfair process. In Bollenbach v. United States,lI3 the Court stated that "the 
question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt 
has been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards appro- 
priate for criminal trials in the federal courts."114 The Court's more recent 
approach appears to equate a determination of guilt with a determination of 
fairness. In Rose v. Clark,11s the Court wrote: "Where a reviewing court can 
find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be 
affirmed."lI6 The intensity with which courts throughout the country have 
invoked harmless error to preserve convictions despite serious constitutional, 
evidentiary, and procedural violations inevitably invites the cynical response 
for nonconstitutional error formulated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and 
the outcome-determinative standard for constitutional error formulated in Strickland v. Wash- 
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See genera& Michael T .  Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1298 (1988) (arguing that prosecutorial misconduct should not be examined using 
outcome-derivative test). 
110. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287. 294 (1939). 
111. See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J .  CRIM. L. 
& Cruhmro ro~~  421, 440 (1980) (arguing that harmless error tempts prosecutors to use evidence 
or  techniques they would otherwise avoid because of potential appellate reversal). 
112. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks, Co., 155 F.2d 631, 662 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946). 
113. 326 U.S. 607 (1946). 
114. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946). 
115. 478 U.S. 570 (1986). 
116. Rose v. Clark. 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). 
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that "if [a defendant] is obviously guilty as charged, he has no fundamental 
right to be tried fairly."IB7 
The harmless error rule has been described as " c h a ~ t i c , " ~ ~  " ~ a y w a r d , " ~ ~  
and " ins id i~us"~~  due to its standardless and ad hoc application by appellate 
judges who purport to be making precise quantitative and qualitative calcu- 
lations of the impact of errors based on the "cold black and white of a 
printed record."121 Under the new harmless error jurisprudence, the trial's 
outcome transcends the process. The reviewing court's apparent unwillingness 
to appreciate that many errors cannot be quantified, and its inability to 
measure accurately the distorting impact that such errors can have on the 
truth-finding process, is increasingly evident, but increasingly deemed irrele- 
vant .Iu 
Brecht offers a striking example of the essential absurdity of harmless 
error review. Prior to the Supreme Court's review, three state appellate judges 
and a federal district court concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct was 
sufficiently harmful to require a new trial. Another state appellate court, 
consisting of six judges, found the prosecutor's misconduct insufficiently 
harmful. Another panel of three federal judges found the misconduct harmless 
under the much more relaxed standard for nonconstitutional errors. 
However, the most pernicious effect of Brecht is not that it will inevitably 
prevent many constitutional violations from being corrected, although that 
effect is an inevitable byproduct. Rather, Brecht provides an attractive in- 
ducement to state officials either to disregard constitutional rights entirely, 
or to view the violation of the right less seriously than would be the case if 
effective federal oversight were available. Under the Brecht standard, a federal 
court on habeas review could conclude that a constitutional error was com- 
mitted and that the error was harmful under the Chapman standard, but 
nevertheless deny the writ because the petitioner failed to prove that the 
violation caused actual and substantial prejudice to hi$ case. Furthermore, 
even though Arizona v. FulminanteIu subjects virtually every type of consti- 
tutional violation to harmless error review, Brecht effectively locks the door 
to meaningful habeas review of most constitutional trial  violation^.^^ 
117. Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486 
(1959). 
118. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 998 (1973). 
119. TRAYNOR, supra note 86, at  13. 
120. Goldberg, supra note 111, at  421. 
121. United States v. Gmnberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting United States 
v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1957)). 
122. For several examples of the courts' refusal to recognize harmful conduct, see Bennett 
L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pm. L. REV. 393, 428 n.226 (1992). 
123. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
124. Some federal courts have adopted Justice Stevens' cautionary approach in reviewing 
constitutional violations under the new Brecht standard, suggesting that the new standard may 
not have locked the courthouse doors entirely. For cases upholding the grant of the writ under 
the new standard, see Shaw v. Collins, 5 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1993) (S i th  Amendment confrontation 
violation for prosecutor to refuse to call complaining witness); Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Brecht v. Abrahamson strikes a heavy blow to effective federal oversight 
of state constitutional violations. Brecht does not prevent a petitioner from 
entering the federal courthouse gate to have his petition considered on the 
merits, but it locks the courtroom doors to meaningful review.of those merits. 
The Court reached a confusing and illogical result in an unprincipled manner. 
Having granted certiorari to examine whether a discrete constitutiond rule- 
a Doyle violation-should be analyzed on collateral review under a more 
relaxed harmless error standard, the Court concluded that every constitutional 
claim involving trial error should be similarly evaluated. The Court justified 
this ruling by invoking the rhetoric of finality, federalism, and judicial 
economy that traditionally has been associated with institutional concerns 
over protecting judgments that were fairly obtained or when the complaining 
party engaged in procedural default or abuse of the writ. Brecht is the first 
case to insulate from effective federal habeas review state judgments that are 
unconstitutionally obtained, but nevertheless have been upheld following 
potentially flawed state appellate review. Although purporting to be based on 
valid institutional considerations, Brecht v.   bra hams on is an illogical and 
perverse extension of the Rehnquist Court's campaign to rid the federal courts 
of habeas corpus. 
1336 (11th Cir. 1993) (Eighth Amendment violation to allow jury to consider vacated conviction 
when deciding whether to impose death sentence), cert. denied, 114 S.  Ct. 1126 (1994); Stoner 
v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation violation to use 
videotape deposition testimony instead of live witness testimony); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 
770 (5th Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation violation to use videotaped interview of 
complaining witness); Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.) (due process violation to 
allow withdrawn guilty plea to be used as substantive evidence against defendant), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 579 (1993); Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1993) (due process violation to 
admit evidence of uncharged crime); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) (due 
process violation to use character evidence to show propensity), cert. denied, 114 S .  Ct. 622 
(1993); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715 (I lth Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation 
violation to allow complaining witness to testify outside courtroom and outside defendant's 
presence), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). 
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